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COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL ASSESSMENT:  
PRACTICE-BASED VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF 
NEUROSCIENCE 
 
JOHN T. PHILIPSBORN* & MELISSA HAMILTON** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What follows is a discussion that is meant for judges, forensic mental 
health experts, and lawyers whose involvement in criminal cases means, 
when necessary, accessing the tools and knowledge to address, analyze, and 
respond to evidence of the accused’s alleged incompetence to stand trial. 
There is here a discussion of practice guidelines, caselaw, competence-
related orders, commentaries, and recommendations that should be pertinent 
when the accused’s competence to stand trial is questionable. Courts, and the 
lawyers who appear in such cases, should be aware of the information that 
can be offered by neuroscientists from the various fields involved in 
researching, assessing, and documenting brain structure and function. This 
writing, a combination of a literature review and a commentary that includes 
illustrative court orders, is offered by the combination of a practicing lawyer 
with more than forty years of criminal case litigation experience, some of it 
as counsel of record in competence adjudications and otherwise as a court 
qualified lawyer-expert on competence to stand trial, and by an academic 
who researches the use of forensic science in the law.  
Readers will find here different perspectives on what are touted 
elsewhere as leading examples of cases demonstrating the utility of 
neuroimaging in competence adjudications. Also offered are examples of 
competence adjudications known mainly by practicing lawyers but not yet 
discussed in journals. These should be viewed as examples of litigation 
conducted by knowledgeable lawyers who effectively blended neuroimaging 
and neuroscience testimony with other wide-ranging forms of competence 
 
* John T. Philipsborn, M.Ed, JD, MAS, is a private practice lawyer and a visiting 
scholar at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Neuroscience and Society and 
the University of California’s Center for Law and Society. 
** Melissa Hamilton is a Reader of Law & Criminal Justice, has her JD from the 
University of Surrey School of Law and her Ph.D from The University of Texas at 
Austin (criminal justice). 





related evidence. These case studies are offered to explain how 
neuroscientists were called upon in one case to buttress and offer 
corroboration for the various psychiatric and neuropsychological 
assessments, and in another to detect a structural anomaly in the brain of the 
accused that helped provide more specific information about the cause of 
impairments detected through other techniques. These case examples support 
recently expressed views about the main uses of neuroimaging in criminal 
cases as further discussed here. 
Two researchers with extensive expertise in the field of mental 
disabilities observed that: “there has been almost no consideration of the 
application of neuroimaging evidence in the area of criminal law in which 
mental status issues play the largest role: that of incompetency to stand 
trial.”1 The observation may apply to the majority of competence 
assessments, but as will be confirmed in the casework reviewed here, 
neuroscience has at times been involved in competence assessments and 
adjudications particularly in cases in which lawyers have had the knowledge 
and resources to work with neuroscientists. This involvement also requires a 
judge willing to permit introduction of the evidence. Some examples of the 
involvement of neuroimaging in competence assessments can be found in 
proceedings from more than twenty years ago. And practice guidelines for 
forensic psychiatric evaluation of competence to stand trial have referenced 
the possible use of neuroimaging since 2007. The ‘lack of consideration’ 
seems to stem in part from the on-going lack of training of lawyers, and some 
forensic mental health professionals, in the breadth of methodologies that are 
available to help assess the many types of disorders, disabilities, injuries, and 
abnormalities that can be at the root of a competence question.  
It has often been observed that competence assessments are part of 
the routine for those involved in the regular practice of forensic psychology 
and forensic psychiatry.2 Yet routine assessments often are not conducted as 
thoroughly as recommended in the published competence assessment 
guidelines, and according to the processes recommended in some of the 
practice literature—both of which are discussed below. In most busy court 
 
1 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, My Brain Is So Wired: Neuroimaging’s 
Role in Competency Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities, 27 PUB. INT. 
L.J. 73, 95 (2018). 
2 Patricia A. Zapf et al., Assessing Competency to Stand Trial, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 281, 281 (Irving B. Weiner & Randy K. Otto 
eds., 2013). 





systems, a continuum of competence assessments and related discussions 
will involve what the outcome of a given case should be, based upon reports 
that submitted by the designated competence examiners. A contested 
competence-related evidentiary hearing or trial (where competence can be 
tried to a court or jury) is a less frequent occurrence. Indeed, even in 
jurisdictions where there are specialized mental health courts, contested 
hearings involving experts from several disciplines can be a rarity.3 Most 
competence-related questions are addressed without profound inquiry, and 
without attention to best professional practices.4 The evidence supporting the 
claim of incompetence, or undermining it, is often deemed sufficient based 
on the reports of one or two examiners to permit the matter to be resolved 
short of a prolonged set of hearings. It makes sense that knowledgeable 
commentators would describe neuroimaging as an endeavor which has been 
too little considered or discussed in competence assessment in general. 
Some of the scholarly literature on neuroscience and law addresses 
the intersection of the subjects as though it is outside both the frame of 
reference of the ‘regular’ professional participants (judges, defense counsel, 
prosecutors) in the court systems in the United States.5 And that is all too 
often the case. It is likely that part of the reason for the lack of consultation 
with or involvement of neuroscientists in competence assessments is that 
lawyers who are raising competence questions, and asking for the 
appointment of examiners, may not have received advice or training about 
multidisciplinary competence-assessment processes. Lawyers who are 
current with the breadth of practice literature and training are aware of 
competence assessment as a multidisciplinary endeavor and may insist on 
approaching specific cases in that manner.6  
 
3 Id. at 288.  
4 Id. at 283 (noting that most states fail to require specific training for mental 
health professionals carrying out competence assessments). 
5 David Collins, Re-Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial, 82 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 157, 176–80 (2019). 
6 United States v. Duhon, 104 F.Supp.2d 663, 669 (W.D. La. 2000) (referencing 
the need for input from defense counsel as explained in Michael Burt & John 
Philipsborn, Assessment of Client Competence: A Suggested Approach, NACDL 
CHAMPION 18 (June 1998)); Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating 
Competence to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 459 (2009) (blaming both researchers and practitioners for 
polarization that is incompatible with multidisciplinary approaches to competence 
 
 






COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL – A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
The constitutionally-required definition of competence to stand trial 
is found in two decisions of the United States Supreme Court. As the Court 
explained in Indiana v. Edwards (2008):7 “The two cases that set forth the 
Constitution’s ‘mental competence’ standard…” are Dusky v. United States 
(1960) and Drope v. Missouri (1975).8 Dusky specified that the inquiry 
regarding competence includes the questions of (1) whether he has “a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him…,” and (2) 
whether he “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.”9 Drope has been referenced as 
either adding or clarifying that a person is incompetent if he “lacks the 
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, 
to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.”10 
In a later ruling, Godinez v. Moran (1993), the Supreme Court ruled 
that there is one set of required abilities and capacities that must be 
established to exist in a particular person to allow a court to determine that 
she, or he, is competent to stand trial.11 The Godinez Court reiterated earlier 
requirements set out by the Court that individuals who face criminal charges 
are required to have a factual and rational understanding of the criminal 
charges at issue and of the court-related proceedings, and they must be able 
to make decisions to exercise or give up the rights that the Constitution has 
reserved to them in criminal cases. 
 
assessment); The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law (AAPL) makes 
reference to jurisdictions that may use multidisciplinary teams as part of a psychiatric 
assessment in Section 5.3.1 of the AAPL’s Practice Guideline for the Forensic 
Assessment, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S9 (2015). Many different 
professional organizations provide training for practicing lawyers. Prosecutors and 
defense counsel can attend sessions given by national regional state and local 
organizations and offices. There are also practice-related periodicals that carry 
articles on a wide variety of topics, including competence assessment. Examples 
include the NACDL Champion and ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Criminal 
Justice. 
7 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170–71 (2008). 
8 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); Drope v. Missouri, 
420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
9 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 
10 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). 
11 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 





These basic, constitutionally-rooted rights include the accused’s 
right to contest the charges in a trial, or to decide to give up the right to go to 
trial and plead guilty. Any accused must have a rational understanding of the 
right to trial as well as the right to confront witnesses by being present in 
court and cross-examining those witnesses through counsel. These rights also 
involve the right to testify, to contest or respond to the charges, or to remain 
silent.12 The decision of whether or not to exercise these rights or not rests 
exclusively with the accused. 
The Supreme Court recognized that individuals who go to trial will 
need to make “other strategic choices,” including “whether (and how) to put 
on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses.”13 While 
the Court explained that the fundamental definition of competence “seeks to 
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist 
counsel,” it went on to state that “[w]hile psychiatrists and scholars may find 
it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while 
States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than 
the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these 
additional requirements.”14  
Operationally, the designated experts try to arrive at their opinions 
on a defendant’s competence through a combination of evaluations—or, 
where only one or two evaluators have been involved, by seeking to assess 
particular abilities and capacities, and then tying these to the requirements of 
competence. Components of a competence evaluation may involve the 
assessment of whether the accused manifests symptoms and hallmarks of a 
major mental illness or of an evident intellectual or developmental disability. 
The evaluators may then refine the inquiry into the individual’s mental 
condition, cognitive abilities, decision-making capacities, learning abilities, 
and abilities to communicate. Evaluators may then use standardized 
competence tools that could include a semi-structured interview or use of 
various competence assessment devices. Next, knowledgeable experts write 
a report linking their findings to the legal standards set forth by statutes and 
the courts.  
The ‘consumers’ of competence evaluations (courts and lawyers) are 
interested in information on the validity of performance during assessments 
and of symptoms reported. At the same time, these consumers may have an 
 
12 Id. at 397–98. 
13 Id. at 398–99. 
14 Id. at 401–02. 





interest in being informed about the likely cause(s) of reported impairments, 
particularly where the combination of interviewing, record review, 
psychometric testing, and competence assessment ‘testing’ leaves some 
questions about the basis for the reported impairments unaddressed. 
One additional explanation of the legally defined contours of the 
competence requirement bears discussion – particularly because the 
reference here is to a matter that was recently reexamined by the United 
States Supreme Court. This additional matter underscores the relationship 
between the legal condition of competence to stand trial and the legally 
discussed autonomy that the accused, who is competent, is recognized to 
have. This autonomy was discussed again recently in a case that originated 
in Louisiana–a death penalty case–McCoy v. Louisiana (2018).15 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and explained the following: 
Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to 
assert innocence belongs in this latter category [of 
decisions reserved for the accused]. Just as a defendant 
may steadfastly refused to plead guilty in the face of 
overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the 
assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant’s own 
inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so 
may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial. These are not strategic choices 
about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are 
choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are.16 
The McCoy Court further explained that: “[w]hen a client expressly asserts 
that the objective of ‘his defense’ is to maintain innocence of the charged 
criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override 
it by conceding guilt.”17 
 McCoy makes it clear that the consequences of a ruling that the 
accused is competent can be highly significant. As with the patient in a 
hospital setting who is deemed competent to refuse treatment, the accused 
who decides to stake out a position in a criminal case against the advice of a 
lawyer may well live (or die) as a consequence of that decision. For lawyers 
 
15 McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018). 
16 Id. at 1508–09 (emphasis in original). 
17 Id. at 1509–10 (citing the Sixth Amendment and the 2016 ABA Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (a “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of the representation….”)). 





in capital cases, or in other cases that may result in lengthy sentences, where 
there is a doubt about the accused’s competence, due diligence will militate 
in favor of at least getting advice about the best competence evaluation 
practices applicable to the client and case—which may result in a 
recommendation of consultation with a neuroscientist resulting in 
neuroimaging or other procedures. 
 In competence cases, courts seek information and guidance on how 
a particular disorder, deficit, or symptom is related to one of the elements of 
the competence definitions in Supreme Court precedent and in the 
jurisdiction in question.18 In addition, the question of concern to a court is to 
assess ‘how real’ the problem described is and the extent to which it has been 
verified.19 Those are matters on which neuroscientists of various kinds may 
be consulted not because only they have the most persuasive information 
available, but because they may add some additional case-related data and 
general information for consideration in addressing the legal decisions that a 
court will make.  
II.  
THE HEARTLAND OF COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
The output of a routine competence to stand trial assessment is likely 
to take the form of a report that may have been prepared by an examiner, a 
few reports, or perhaps a composite report from a group of examiners if the 
accused has been evaluated in a hospital setting. The examiner(s) are likely 
to include a psychiatrist or a psychologist. In a few jurisdictions, the 
examiner could be a social worker or a doctoral-level trainee. The report may 
reflect an interview process conducted over a period of some hours or, in the 
instance of more thorough evaluations, over a period of days or weeks 
(particularly if the accused is ordered to be evaluated in a state hospital or 
locked ward setting). The report is likely to cover: the charges; some aspect 
of the background of the case; aspects of the accused’s personal, social, 
medical, psychiatric, and psychological history; descriptions of prior 
hospitalizations and courses of psychotropic medications; and history of head 
 
18 Andrew D. Reisner & Jennifer L. Piel, Mental Condition Requirement in 
Competency to Stand Trial Requirements, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 86, 
88–89 (2018). 
19 Barry W. Wall et al., AAPL Practice Resource for the Forensic Psychiatric 
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S4, 
S21 (Supp. 2018). 





injuries.20 The report is also likely to contain some information about 
diagnostic impressions or, in some jurisdictions, a statement of the diagnosis 
with reference to DSM-5 or another commonly referenced authoritative 
publication.21 Competence assessments will often reference the examiners’ 
attention to performance and symptom validity issues, and may either 
conclude with a specific opinion about the accused’s competence or 
incompetence to stand trial.22 Where the opinion is in favor of incompetence, 
the findings may be accompanied in some reports by recommendations for 
further treatment, medication, or remedial support.23 If the opinion is in favor 
of competence, there may be cautionary notes about circumstances under 
which the accused may decompensate.  
Publications covering forensic assessment in criminal cases describe 
competence-related assessment as “arguably the most common type of 
involvement of forensic mental health professionals in the justice system.”24 
The assessment of the accused in a criminal case whose competence was in 
question was, for a number of years, usually performed in a state hospital or 
another in-patient setting until laws and procedures were changed:  
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, bolstered by 
research indicating that competence evaluations 
conducted by psychiatrists are no better than evaluations 
conducted by other mental health professionals, states 
increasingly authorized psychologists and social workers 
to perform competence examinations – a trend that 
facilitated the decentralization of forensic systems by 
expanding locally available forensic resources.25 
Depending on the training, licensure, qualifications, and experience 
of the examiner, competence evaluations may combine the examiner’s 
inquiry into: (1) present symptoms of mental disorder and any diagnosis (2) 
 
20 Carla A. Lourenco, Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial, in 
PSYCHOLOGISTS’ DESK REFERENCE 609, 610 (Gerald P. Koocher et al. eds., 2013). 
21 CHARLES SCOTT, DSM-5 AND THE LAW: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES, 110–
11 (2015). 
22 Lourenco, supra note 20, at 611. 
23 Id. 
24 PATRICIA A. ZAPF & RONALD ROESCH, EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE TO 
STAND TRIAL 3 (2009). 
25 GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: 
A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 130 (4th ed. 
2018). 





standardized psychological testing to assess aspects of functioning, and (3) 
competence-specific inquiry. Publications aimed at forensic psychiatric 
assessment (by psychiatrists) will establish “a baseline regarding a 
defendant’s general abilities and functioning…[and] ask questions 
specifically related to trial competency.”26 
For a considerable time, competence assessment was an 
unstandardized endeavor, guided mainly by the individualized practices of 
the examiner.27 The initially ‘systematized’ inquiries may, or may not, have 
used checklists.28 By 1965, at least one checklist “intended for use by 
psychiatrists in providing a brief, convenient review of areas for investigation 
in evaluating whether a patient can be considered competent to stand trial or 
must be considered incompetent by reason of intellectual or mental defect” 
had been published.29 Shortly thereafter, however, a series of well-known 
publications told courts, lawyers, and mental health professionals that 
“despite the ever-increasing utilization of psychiatric and psychological 
evidence in the legal process, such evidence frequently does not meet 
reasonable criteria of admissibility, and should not be admitted in a court of 
law, and if admitted, should be given little or no weight.”30 And, beginning 
in the 1970s, interested psychiatrists and psychologists organized and 
advanced the field of forensic mental health evaluation. 
Those who led the efforts were motivated by various critiques of the 
then-current system: few thoughtfully developed standardized practices in 
forensic assessment; vague professional standards; a field unmoored from to 
the questions at issue in the legal system; and little available ongoing and 
specialized training.31 Neither the mental health professionals conducting 
 
26 THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 266 (Liza H. Gold & Richard L. Friersen eds., 3rd ed. 2018). 
27 Loren E. Mallory & Michelle R. Guyton, Competency to Stand Trial and 
Criminal Responsibility in Forensic Neuropsychology Practice, in APA HANDBOOK 
OF FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 341, 347 (Shane S. Bush ed., 2017). 
28 Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding the 
Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial, 21 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 351, 353 (2003). 
29 Ames Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for 
Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616, 617 (1965). 
30 JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 1 
(5th ed. 1995) (citing Ziskin’s 1970 First Edition). 
31 Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Community Examiners' Evaluations 
of Competence to Stand Trial: Common Problems and Suggestions for Improvement, 
29 PROF. PSYCHOL. 357, 364 (1998). 





examinations nor the lawyers offering mental health evidence had sufficient 
knowledge of one another’s fields to ensure that the courts were being 
provided with legally relevant and useful mental health assessment 
information.32 There were increasing calls for improvements, such as: 
specialized training and education; the creation of professional organizations 
devoted to the endeavor; the need for further research and development of 
specialized tools; and standardized methodologies.33 These developments 
resonated with groups of researchers, academics, and mental health 
professionals who had been concerned about the need for a research-based, 
empirically validated approach to forensic assessment. In part because the 
assessment of competence to stand trial was recognized to be the most 
frequently called upon form of forensic mental health assessment in state and 
federal criminal courts, in the 1990s a cadre of psychologists, social 
scientists, and law school faculty researched the theoretical framework for 
some of the competence assessment tools that are in common use today.34  
One of the contributions to the advancement of forensic mental 
health assessment as a field was the development of the MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication (“MacCAT-CA”). 
Others added to the development of standardized assessment tools that 
focused on the assessment of abilities, capacities, and basic knowledge of 
legal processes that are discussed in decisions where the United States 
Supreme Court set forth the requirement of competence to stand trial.35 The 
more elaborate and well-developed competency assessment tools take the 
form of structured or semi-structured interviews that may use differing 
approaches to provide examiners data on the accused’s competence.  
MacCAT-CA uses a vignette describing a hypothetical crime as the 
 
32 Robert A. Nicholson et al., A Comparison of Instruments Competency to Stand 





33 Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial 
with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 453 (2009). 
34 See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A 
Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992); Steven K. Hoge et al., 
The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development and Validation of a 
Research Instrument, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (1997). 
35 Deborah K. Cooper & Thomas Grisso, Five Year Research Update (1991-
1995): Evaluations for Competence to Stand Trial, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 347 (1997). 





platform to assess what the coauthors of the tool describe as, three 
competence-related abilities: understanding, reasoning, and appreciation.36 
The Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial – Revised (“ECST-R”) has a 
different structure and underlying methodology, built around what the 
authors have described as separate dimensions of competence to stand trial, 
with included items and scales for atypical presentation, as well as some 
inquiry into case-specific information.37 
The competence assessment tools just mentioned are only two 
among many tools, inventories, and devices used by forensic examiners 
during competence assessments. A basic orientation to the subject of 
competence assessment mentions twelve different competence-related 
tools,38 though this represents only a small fraction of the various competence 
assessment questionnaires, interviews, and tools in use today.  
As this piece is written, the combination of forensic examiners in 
private practice throughout the United States; local and county forensic 
mental health components; state hospitals; locked mental health facilities, 
and the like, have developed their own ‘packages’ of competence 
assessment-related materials which may include some of the published 
inventories/structured interviews as well as inventories that emphasize local 
or state approaches to competence evaluation. Some large facilities have 
been involved in the competence assessment endeavor for years. For 
example, the California State Hospital system and the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons medical facilities disseminate policy statements concerning forensic 
examinations; have procedure manuals covering competence evaluations; 
training circulars covering the same topic; and, in certain areas, 
administrative regulations and other legal requirements for the level of 
training of competence examiners and for the need for some level of 
systematized competence assessment process.39 
 
36 STEVEN K. HOGE ET AL., THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL 
– CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION (1999).  
37 RICHARD ROGERS ET AL., EVALUATION OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL – 
REVISED (2004). 
38 Melton et al., supra note 25, at 141–51. 
39 For example, California Penal Code § 1369(h)(1) (West 2019) provides that 
California’s State Department of State Hospitals “…shall adopt guidelines for 
education and training standards for a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to be 
considered for appointment by the court pursuant to this section [pertinent to ‘mental 
 
 





Currently, a wide variety of materials - from book-length treatments, 
to journal articles, to practice guides of various kinds - offer guidance to 
psychiatrists and psychologists who are regularly involved in the assessment 
of competence to stand trial. Many of these guides used models that were 
developed during the 1990s and now provide nuanced discussions of 
assessment approaches.40 
III.  
THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF THE 
ACCUSED’S INCOMPETENCE 
Many of the statutes enacted to provide a mechanism for a court to 
address questions of the accused’s competence to stand trial place the burden 
of raising the issue on the litigating attorneys and the presiding judge. As an 
illustration, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) specifies that: 
[T]he defendant or the attorney for the Government may 
file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental 
competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the 
motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, 
if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant 
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect 
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his 
defense. 
There are various scenarios that result in the signaling of a concern to the 
attorneys/judge about the accused’s possible incompetence to stand trial 
 
competence’].” The same statute provides for the creation of a working group 
representing parts of the criminal court system, including judges, various lawyers, 
advocates for those with mental disabilities, psychologists, psychiatrists, and related 
professional associations. 
40 One example of a nuanced discussion is provided by a well-known contributor 
to the development of competence assessment approaches. THOMAS GRISSO, 
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATIONS: JUST THE BASICS (2014). In his 
introduction, Dr. Grisso explained that his aim with this guide, one of many 
publications that he has authored or coauthored, was that this publication might be 
considered a good starting place: “[b]ecause of its simplicity. It offers less detail and 
avoids many of the complexities that can arise across competence cases. So it allows 
you to see the forest before you start inspecting the trees.” Id. at iii. Another example 
of a practice guide is ZAPF & ROESCH, supra note 24. 





(interactions with counsel, acting out in court, observations made by jail staff, 
reports from family members, etc.). 
Defense lawyers often initiate competence litigation after interaction 
with their clients. According to prevailing practice standards, and the laws in 
some jurisdictions, counsel have an obligation to communicate with their 
clients about the case generally, and about the consequences of the case (in 
terms of outcomes, sentences, and collateral consequences). Defense lawyers 
are—assuming sufficient experience and knowledge—ideally placed to 
begin the evaluation of the accused’s level of factual and rational 
understanding of the proceedings, and of the case. Lawyers will often be the 
first, and sometimes the only, person who communicates the breadth of 
decisions that the accused has available, and what strategies may be 
employed to achieve the desired outcomes (as well as assessing the 
probabilities of possible outcomes). These communications should 
(assuming informed and invested lawyers) yield an initial database on how 
the accused matches up with the legal requirements of competence.  
 Indeed, several courts have concluded that where defense counsel is 
on notice that a client may be incompetent, he or she has a duty to raise the 
question of the accused’s competence so that it can be addressed by the court. 
Then, once counsel raises the competence issue, the defense counsel has a 
unique role to play. The United States Supreme Court has explained that: 
“judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [competence] issues 
into focus”41 and “defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of 
the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.”42  
Consequently, these types of criminal cases thrust lawyers into a 
field involving the intersection of law and mental health. As noted, defense 
counsel spend time with the accused during the pendency of the case. While 
prosecutors are not likely to speak directly with the accused, experienced 
prosecutors will have collected information about the defendant, and will tap 
information from witnesses, investigators, jailers, and others about the 
accused. These scenarios entail challenges where lawyers are not trained in 
the basics of mental health assessment. And they also explain why some 
lawyers with extensive training and experience in forensic mental health 
issues are more likely to reach out to neuroscientists (in addition to other 
forensic mental health professionals) when the accused manifests certain 
disabilities or impairments. 
 
41 Drope, 420 U.S. at 176–77. 
42 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449–50 (1992). 





So, how might legal practitioners become sufficiently 
knowledgeable to effectively litigate competency issues, particularly in terms 
of both the law and science? The question is particularly salient for defense 
counsel because of their ethical burden to provide the accused effective 
representation according to prevailing professional practices.43 Attorneys 
may now look to several sources for guidance on competency assessment 
litigation, including sources written more from the legal perspective. 
Notably, the professional training models for competency targeted to the 
legal professional are not at the same level of practical information and 
guidance as those that have long been provided to forensic mental health 
professionals. In 2016, the ABA adopted its fourth set of Criminal Justice 
Standards on Mental Health.44 These standards reference current literature, 
like the DSM-5, and set forth a combination of aspirational and practice-
related standards and guidelines, including approaches to the assessment of 
competence to stand trial. There is an entire set of standards covering 
“competence to proceed.”45 Judges may access state or local bench books, 
which may have basic information on competence proceedings.46 
Criminal lawyers who wish to obtain further education and training 
may seek specialized training—and some defense offices, bar programs, 
prosecutors’ offices, or courts may require that lawyers working with them 
obtain relevant, advanced skills. For example, in the past thirty years, a 
combination of national organizations (including the National District 
Attorneys Association, the American Bar Association, the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others) have presented a wide 
variety of continuing education programs on forensic mental health issues.47 
The American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological 
Association, and their forensic psychiatry and psychology sections, offer 
 
43 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
44 ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standa
rds/mental_health_standards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf. 
45 ABA CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-4.1 (2016). 
46 See, e.g., UNC SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES’ 
BENCHBOOK (2015), https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/criminal/capacity-proceed; 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (6th ed. 
2013). 
47 One example is the 1994 ABA symposium on psychological expertise and 
criminal justice, described in the three-volume syllabus as: “A conference for 
psychologists and lawyers jointly sponsored by the American Psychological 
Association and the Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association.” 





training provided by the combination of experienced professionals in various 
fields, including psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, as well as from 
experienced lawyers who have addressed matters involved in the assessment 
and determination of a person’s competence to stand trial. One explanation 
for the rise of these types of specialist education and training generally 
derives from the role that mental health issues have played in capital cases 
specifically since the death penalty was revived in the 1970s with significant 
due process protections. 
This background is relevant to understanding lawyers’ (and judges’) 
interest, particularly those already knowledgeable about mental health issues 
in the law, in learning where neuroscience may inform a determination (and 
assessment) of competence to stand trial. What has been lacking in the 
current commentary on neuroscience and law, particularly that written by 
full-time academics, is an understanding of how case work is actually done 
by lawyers who have varying degrees of expertise and training on matters 
like forensic mental health assessment. While a small proportion of licensed 
lawyers attend law school after having received training and a terminal 
degree in medicine or psychology, the vast majority are dependent on a 
variety of ad hoc training and continuing education programs, as well as both 
experiential learning and advice from colleagues, in developing their 
approaches to clients (or for prosecutors, to defendants) with mental health 
issues. In established public defender offices, lawyers may shadow their 
more experienced colleagues to learn how specific issues are addressed in 
that jurisdiction. As lawyers acquire experience and information through case 
work, they will face varying challenges that may include an accused who 
appears incompetent or who may have a history of psychiatric treatment and 
hospitalizations. These situations often lead to interaction with forensic 
mental health experts from various professions, and concurrent review of 
pertinent literature. It is not unusual for experienced lawyers who have 
worked with a wide variety of medical and mental health experts to have been 
introduced to neuroscientists and the tools of neuroscience used by 
researchers and clinicians. 
At the same time, some of the lawyers involved in sophisticated 
litigation have shared their expertise with their colleagues in training sessions 
and in publications such that there is now a small cadre of lawyers who have 
been recognized in the profession as having an understanding of the available 
best practices in competence litigation. This has also led to the development 
of a select group of lawyers who, at times, are called upon (and permitted) to 





testify as experts in courtroom proceedings on various aspects of competence 
issues.48 It is also one of the factors that has led to an expanded role for 
neuroscientists in cases that call for a multidisciplinary assessment 
framework. At the same time, however, as is true in any number of 
professions—lawyers who do not pursue available information and training 
or happen to practice in jurisdictions that do not emphasize attention to 
professional development will often fail to consider the basic tools necessary 
to adequately represent their clients in addressing competence issues. 
IV.  
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT APPROACHES IN EVALUATIONS OF 
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 
A federal judge observed in a ruling in a competence adjudication, 
“that a multi-disciplinary approach is often critical in resolving competency 
issues.”49 Knowledgeable experts and lawyers concur with this observation. 
Some of the reasoning for courts and lawyers to seek and obtain information 
beyond that offered by a routine competence evaluation conducted by a 
psychiatrist or a psychologist (or even pairings of such experts) can be found 
in some of the literature that discusses research into competence 
adjudications in criminal courts. Researchers have noted that “the majority 
 
48 See, e.g., the discussion in Duhon, where one of the operative questions was 
whether there was reliable expert opinion available through examiners at the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons that the accused had been restored to competence. 104 F.Supp.2d 
663. The ruling is one of the few that dissects in some detail the legal structure of the 
concept of competence and the analytical framework for deciding whether 
examining experts have actually addressed the issues that are asked as a result of the 
law. The court in that case cited an example of practice literature written for lawyers 
that is not the focus of this article, in which the court referenced the writings of two 
defense lawyers, noting that where the focus of the court’s determination is on a 
defendant’s ability to assist counsel “‘one of the most evident issues is whether the 
assessing professional, usually a psychiatrist or psychologist, really knows what 
would normally go into the defense of the case.’” Id. at 669 n.21 (citing Burt & 
Philipsborn, supra note 6). Another example of practice literature that has been 
referenced by lawyers is John Philipsborn, Competently Lawyering Competence: The 
Role and Duties of a Lawyer in Addressing Competence to Stand Trial Where the 
Questions Are Focused on Client Communication and Capacity to Assist, CRIM. 




49 Duhon, 104 F.Supp.2d at 699. 





of hearings [on competence questions] last only a few minutes and are held 
simply to confirm the findings of evaluators…[and in most cases] the court 
accepts the recommendations of the evaluators.”50 According to published 
research, well-trained forensic mental-health evaluators using the same semi-
structured competence assessment tools and standardized instruments have 
high rates of agreement on whether given subjects are competent or not. 
However, other researchers have revealed that evaluators at times do disagree 
on the deficits that have been uncovered or described by a competency 
assessment process.51 “It is the more difficult decisions, involving cases 
where competency is truly a serious question, that are of concern. How 
reliable are decisions about these cases? To date, no study has accumulated 
enough of these cases to answer this question.”52 
In light of potentially conflicting expert opinions, as well as in the 
more difficult or complicated cases, lawyers and mental health experts who 
are able to follow best practices (which can be an aspiration limited by the 
financial realities attending a case) will push for multidisciplinary 
involvement in cases where there is a need to provide the court with a wider 
spectrum of information on competency than is typical. The lawyer might 
seek to consult with a neuropsychiatrist who has extensive experience in 
competence assessment, a behavioral neurologist, or an expert on 
neuroimaging and the aging brain.53 One example of a situation in which an 
experienced judge may raise the need for further evaluations or may suggest 
the need for a greater breadth of expertise is where existing reports indicate 
that the accused’s competence may ‘come and go’ – particularly where the 
accused has been medicated and there are questions raised about her/his 
 
50 Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations: 
Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, CT. REV. 28, 29 (Summer 2000). 
51 On the first of the points made, see Zapf & Roesch, supra note 50, at 29; on 
the second point, dealing with research demonstrating the lack of agreement between 
evaluators on deficits uncovered by competency evaluation procedures, see Jennifer 
Skeem et al., The Logic and Reliability of Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial, 
22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998).  
52 Zapf & Roesch, supra note 50, at 30. 
53 James H. Cole et al., Brain Age and Other Bodily ‘Ages’: Implication for 
Neuropsychiatry, 24 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 266 (2019); Mia Anthony & Feng 
Lin, A Systematic Review for Functional Imaging Studies of Cognitive Reserve 
Across the Cognitive Aging Spectrum, 33 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCH. 937 
(2017). 





response to medication.54 Such cases will often be ‘staffed’ by examining 
forensic psychiatrists and forensic psychologists, together with 
neuropsychologists and neuroscientists whose involvement may result in the 
use of one or more types of neuroimaging studies.  
Still, the multi-disciplinary approach requires even more care toward 
properly educating the litigators and judges on the expanded nature of the 
assessment and on the more complicated forensic sciences involved. 
Expanding the circle of experts may also signal that extensive record 
collection has occurred along with more extensive than routine investigation 
of the accused’s history: family; education; medical; social; institutional; 
behavioral; and legal. The increased complexity of a competence evaluation 
may raise questions about the extent to which judges and lawyers are able, in 
their capacity as consumers, to appreciate and understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of particular competence assessment paradigms.55 
Knowledgeable judges have expressed concern in certain instances that the 
experts’ reports submitted on the issue of competence are not providing 
sufficient methodological information or supporting data for the judge to be 
satisfied that an appropriate ruling can be entered. Lawyers may be 
concerned to anticipate the view that ‘interview and testing’ methods are not 
convincing to a particular court. 
V.  
THE WIDE ARRAY OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE DISCUSSIONS 
The role of neuroscience to help answer legal issues is novel and 
brings unique challenges. The Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence (3d ed.), published in 2011, covers a wide range of 
subjects that arise in litigation, including neuroscience.56 The preface to the 
Reference Manual notes that the introduction of such sophisticated scientific 
methods, such as neuroscience, requires judges to improve their knowledge 
bases as a result: 
 
54 Sheldon H. Preskorn, Prediction of Individual Response to Antidepressants 
and Antipsychotics: An Integral Concept, 16 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 
545 (2014). 
55 Authors have written about these concerns over a period of time. See, e.g., 
Jennifer L. Skeem, Stephen L. Golding, Nancy B. Cohen, & Gerald Berge, Logic 
and Reliability of Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
519, 540–47 (1998). 
56 Federal Judicial Center, supra note 46, at xvii. 





Supreme Court decisions during the last decade of the 
twentieth century mandated that federal courts examined 
the scientific basis of expert testimony to ensure that it 
meets the same rigorous standard employed by scientific 
researchers and practitioners outside the courtroom. 
Needless to say, this requirement places a demand on 
judges not only to comprehend the complexities of 
modern science but to adjudicate between parties’ 
differing interpretations of scientific evidence. Science, 
meanwhile, advances. Methods change, new fields are 
born, new tests are introduced, the lexicon expands, and 
fresh approaches to the interpretation of causal relations 
evolve. Familiar terms such as enzymes and molecules are 
replaced by microarray expression and nanotubes; single-
author research studies have now become multi-
institutional, multi-author, international collaborative 
efforts.57 
The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and 
Neuroscience website publishes a graph on the same page as the ‘Law and 
Neuroscience Bibliography,’ showing a rise in the number of publications on 
law and neuroscience from 1984 to 2019. The number arcs upwards 
beginning around 2004, when there were around 100 publications, to more 
than 1,800 in 2019.58 By 2015, a combination of journalism, scholarship, 
commentary, and case law helped explain that brain imaging studies, brain-
related metabolic and genetic studies, and explanations of brain structure and 
function coming from professionals whose credentials link them to the 
various disciplines in the neurosciences had all made appearances in courts 
in the United States.59  
At this point in time, neuroscience and law have a relationship. There 
 
57 Id. at xiii. 
58 Vanderbilt University hosts the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on 
Law and Neuroscience, whose publications and publication graph can be found at 
https://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography.php. 
59 See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in U.S. 
Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2015) (illustrating 
academic research on the use of neuroscience evidence in courts); see also KEVIN 
DAVIS, THE BRAIN DEFENSE: MURDER IN MANHATTAN AND THE DAWN OF 
NEUROSCIENCE IN AMERICA’S COURTROOM (2017) (showing an example of a 
journalist’s review of neuroscience and the law). 





is a body of literature on the subject. An informal search of academic 
programs in the United States and Canada reveals more than sixty 
universities and colleges that house departments, institutes, or courses 
addressing some variation of neuroscience and law. There are now senior 
academics involved in researching, teaching, and publishing on the subject. 
Students at the undergraduate and graduate level can study the subjects 
conjunctively. 
In 2018, the National Academy of Sciences published a report titled 
Neuroforensics: Exploring the Legal Implications of Emerging 
Neurotechnologies. The report, in the form of a short book, discussed the 
many subjects related to legal issues addressed by courts in which courts have 
allowed neuroscience-related evidence, and the potential for such evidence 
in the future. At this point, there have been a number of publications that 
have reiterated information about the proliferation – the noticeable, 
exponential growth – of law and neuroscience writing, and an almost equally 
impressive proliferation in the United States of university departments, 
graduate studies, certificates, and degrees in law and neuroscience.  
Interdisciplinary groups of writers have lent their knowledge to 
discussions of neuroscience in courts, explaining the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various imaging technologies that were the subject of 
discussion in court settings. In 2013, one such group summed up the state of 
affairs by explaining: 
The ability of neuroscientific techniques to shed light on 
important aspects of human cognition has generated hope 
that neuroscience can help to answer some perennial 
questions in courts of law. However, one should keep in 
mind that it is easier to misunderstand or misapply 
neuroscience data than it is to understand and apply them 
correctly, and this is crucially important when lives and 
livelihoods depend on it. Whether courts can successfully 
navigate these challenging waters will depend on the level 
of engagement by neuroscientists.60 
This language is particularly interesting given that the Dean of one 
prominent law school and a faculty member who teaches neuroscience and 
law at another school coauthored the article. Their suggestion seems to ignore 
 
60 Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE 730, 735 (2013), 
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2093&context=f
aculty-publications. 





that developing bodies of knowledge and the advent of new technologies are 
inevitable in the business of the courts. Cautionary notes about not allowing 
speculative theories and unreliable methodologies are a concern in court 
proceedings. Case law, along with statutes and rules, discuss these concerns 
and address them in varying ways that allow courts to exclude irrelevant or 
unreliable evidence.  
Periodically, some major development reminds the legal community 
of the need to give attention to the quality and utility of science and technical 
knowledge in courts. That was part of what prompted and has accompanied 
the publication of the 2009 report of the National Research Council entitled 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. That 
report, covering a number of areas of the forensic bench sciences, 
identification sciences, and death investigations, has been associated with a 
wide variety of efforts to improve training for forensic scientists (and 
members of the legal profession) and to underscore the need for attention to 
the use of valid and reliable methods in a number of areas of scientific and 
technical crime-related endeavors. Judges and lawyers on both sides are 
generally aware that any number of half-baked bits of ‘science’ have crept 
into court proceedings and are aware as well that members of the legal 
profession have aided and abetted the use of nonsense and ‘bad science’ in 
courts, with some of the ‘experts’ willing to peddle this bad science.  
VI.  
NEUROIMAGING AS PART OF A COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN 
DISCUSSED FOR YEARS  
While some of the more recent scholarship on neuroscience in the 
courtroom (cited above) has managed to refer to the consideration of 
neuroimaging in an assessment process, the reality is that the encouragement 
for practitioners considering neuroimaging studies as potentially informative 
in competence inquiries has been available for years.  
In her overview of neuroscience evidence in reported (and 
unreported) cases in the United States, Professor Nita Farahany explained 
that ‘neurobiological’ evidence on the question of competence to stand trial 
has been introduced in court proceedings over a period of years. The subject 
of competence to stand trial surfaced in twenty percent of the non-capital 
cases and nine percent of the capital cases reported by a study that she 





reviewed.61 Dr. John Meixner focused on the subject at hand in a relatively 
recent article, titled Neuroscience and Mental Competency: Current Uses 
and Future Potential.62 Professor Farahany and Dr. Meixner are mentioned 
by name here because their scholarship is among the rare publications that, 
along with the writings of Professor Michael Perlin, have examined the 
relationship between neuroscience and the adjudication of competence to 
stand trial. Professor Perlin, who is quoted above as underscoring the lack of 
consideration of neuroimaging evidence in competence to stand trial 
inquiries, stands alone in this small group as having researched and written 
on competence issues over a period of years, having addressed mental 
disabilities and related legal issues as a practitioner and scholar for years.63 
In 2007, the predominant professional organization for forensic 
psychiatrists affiliated with the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law (“AAPL”), published its Practice 
Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand 
Trial.64 The coauthors of this Practice Guideline (twelve physicians and 
psychiatrists, many with academic affiliations) explain the potential for a 
multi-disciplinary assessment, including neuroscience: “If psychological 
consultation, imaging studies, or laboratory tests are needed to support an 
opinion, the psychiatrist should discuss the need for the examinations with 
the retaining attorney before arranging for them to be performed.”65 The same 
guideline covers the background material that should be explained in a report 
on competence assessment and the guideline specifies: “[f]indings from a 
physical examination, imaging studies, or laboratory tests should be included 
 
61 Farahany, supra note 59, at 496 n.2 (including the illustration and data 
summarized in graph number 6). Professor Farahany distinguished between cases 
focused on competence to stand trial as distinguished from those involving 
competence to plead guilty. This distinction, according to the United States Supreme 
Court in Godinez, 509 U.S. 389, does not exist under the Due Process-related 
competence standard. The comment here is not intended to indicate that Professor 
Farahany erred in her discussion, since it appears that she distinguished between 
competence to stand trial and competence to plead guilty for the purposes of giving 
differing examples of neuroscience evidence in proceedings. 
62 John B. Meixner Jr., Neuroscience and Mental Competency: Current Uses 
and Future Potential, 81 ALBANY L. REV. 995 (2018).  
63 See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 1, at 73, n.1; MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., 
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008). 
64 See generally Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guidelines for the 
Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. S3 (Supp. 2007). 
65 Id. at S28 (emphasis added). 





when they play a role in guiding the psychiatrist’s opinion.”66  
In 2018, the AAPL issued a ‘Practice Resource’ for the evaluation of 
competence to stand trial by psychiatrists. In it, attention to imaging studies, 
as specified in the 2007 Practice Guideline, was restated.67 The AAPL’s 
Practice Guideline with the 2018 Practice Resource is clearly intended to 
provide guidance on practices related to the assessment of competence to 
stand trial. The introduction in the 2007 Practice Guideline and the 2018 
Practice Resource are similar: “it reflects a consensus among members and 
experts about the principles and practice applicable to the conduct of 
evaluations of competence to stand trial.”68 Neither of these published 
resources appears to have been mentioned to date in the scholarship that 
purports to discuss competence assessments as part of a neuroscience and 
law overview.  
The American Psychiatric Association Publishing Textbook of 
Forensic Psychiatry (3d ed.) contains an entire chapter on “Neuroimaging 
and Forensic Psychiatry.” Pertinent to the discussion that follows here, the 
coauthors of the chapter, Drs. Judith Edersheim and Marlynn Wei, 
specifically cover the subject of ‘neuroimaging and criminal competencies.’ 
In discussing the subject, these coauthors explain: “[n]euroimaging 
techniques, particularly when combined with collateral psychological and 
neuropsychological testing, can help identify the existence of structural or 
functional brain abnormalities that might cause deficits in the fundamental 
abilities associated with competence to stand trial.”69  
While this type of fine print might be lost on individuals whose focus 
is on panoramic scholarly research about neuroscience and law, it is not lost 
on knowledgeable psychiatrists, neurologists, or neuropsychologists who are 
conducting assessments of competence, or on lawyers who are either 
presenting that expert or preparing to cross-examine an expert who is familiar 
with the practice literature and with contemporary best practices.  
 
66 Id. at S48. 
67 Wall et al., supra note 19, at S29 (“Findings from a physical examination, 
imaging studies, or laboratory tests should be included [in a report] when they play 
a role in guiding the psychiatrist’s opinion.”).  
68 Id. at S4.  
69 Judith Edersheim & Marlynn Wei, Neuroimaging and Forensic Psychiatry, 
in TEXTBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 94 (3d ed. 2018). 






A REVIEW OF SOME COMPETENCE-RELATED LITIGATION INVOLVING 
DISCUSSION OF NEUROIMAGING 
Disappointingly, some of the discussion of the use of neuroimaging 
in competence assessment cases has not centered on an understanding of 
what courts made of the evidence or on the reasoning that lawyers may have 
had for presenting neuroimaging evidence.70 We review four relevant cases 
here to provide examples of the varying ways that neuroscience and 
neuroimaging evidence has been received in competence adjudications. Two 
of the cases have been cited and discussed elsewhere, though in one instance 
commentators have failed to discuss the full history of the litigation—which, 
if fully reviewed, provides an example of a judge deciding for, and later 
against, the accused’s claim of incompetence based largely on contradictory 
evidence about the implications of neuroimaging studies. The two other cases 
selected have not been discussed elsewhere, and they were chosen in part 
because of the adherence to best practices in competence litigation by the 
defense counsel involved, as well as because of the amount of time that was 
devoted to the overall competence litigation involved.  
The first of our chosen cases that has been singled out by 
commentators as informative about neuroscience in competence assessment 
is one in which a well-known senior federal district court judge considered 
the breadth of information on the accused’s competence yet found 
insufficient evidence to support the defense’s claim of incompetence 
attributed to dementia. The case in point is well known in lawyering and 
forensic mental health training circles now because the accused Vincent ‘The 
Chin’ Gigante challenged his conviction by offering opinions from eight or 
more mental health experts attempting to show his incompetence at the time 
of trial and afterward. Eventually, he admitted falsifying his mental state, 
with a salient news headline reporting the final result: “[a]fter nearly a 
quarter-century of public craziness, Gigante calmly pleaded guilty to 
obstruction of justice for his deception.”71  
 
70 Id. (offering useful observations on neuroimaging and competencies in 
criminal cases and incomplete discussions of United States v. Gigante and United 
States v. Kasim as explained here). 
71 Richard Pyle, Vincent ‘The Chin’ Gigante, 77: Mob Chief Faked Mental 
Illness in Bid to Avoid Prison, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2005), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-20-me-gigante20-story.html.  





The case, involving Vincent Gigante’s prosecution by federal 
authorities in the Eastern District of New York, is one in which there were 
charges (and eventual convictions) of racketeering and conspiracy.72 Both 
during the course of the pre-verdict development of the case, and then after 
the jury rendered a verdict, the defense sought to establish Mr. Gigante’s 
incompetence to stand trial. The defense had placed before the judge multiple 
evaluation reports and expert opinions that Mr. Gigante suffered “from 
dementia, paranoia, and perhaps Alzheimer’s Disease and that he has been 
mentally incompetent since the mid-1980s.”73 The Government argued that 
the evidence was not persuasive and raised concerns about symptom validity 
and diagnostic error. The final reiterations of the claims of incompetence 
resulted in two published orders that discussed the evidence in detail. The 
first order described the showing of incompetence and listed eight experts for 
the defense, most of whom were board certified psychiatrists. The roster of 
government experts consisted of two physicians with multiple degrees and a 
psychologist. Medical and psychological examiners from the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons who had examined Mr. Gigante in an authorized setting also 
submitted competence reports. Two lay witnesses also testified about their 
observations of Mr. Gigante.74 Neuroimaging studies were introduced as part 
of the effort to substantiate a diagnosis of dementia. 
The Gigante competence hearings are still referenced as examples of 
instances in which well-known mental health professionals, including 
established medical school faculty members considered to be leading 
psychiatrists, together with a pioneer in neuroimaging research, left the judge 
unpersuaded by the claim of incompetence given the weight of evidence 
undermining the claim—a development later buttressed by Mr. Gigante’s 
admission of having engaged in deception concerning his mental condition.75  
One of the rulings notes that some of the evidence offered by the 
 
72 United States. v. Gigante, 982 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 166 F.3d 
75 (2d Cir. 1999).  
73 Id. at 173–74. 
74 In addition to the December 1997 Order cited above, Judge Weinstein also 
decided Gigante, 982 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), at the end of October 1997. In 
sum, in the space of approximately two months, Judge Weinstein had written two 
extensive memoranda discussing the competence-related evidence and litigation in 
the Gigante case. 
75 Nathan J. Kolla & Jonathan D. Brodie, Application of Neuroimaging in 
Relationship to Competence to Stand Trial and Insanity, in NEUROIMAGING IN 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 147, 151 (Joseph R. 
Simpson ed., 2012). 





defense was based on PET (Positron Emission Tomography), SPECT scans 
(Single-Photon Emission Computerized Tomography) and CT scans 
(Computerized Tomography).76 Judge Weinstein sided with the opinion(s) 
that the imaging studies “were not consistent with vascular dementia….”77 
Far from supporting an assumption by some critics that judges and lawyers 
will mistakenly be seduced by brain imaging evidence, the outcome of the 
Gigante litigation supports the recognition that judges with experience in 
addressing scientific methodology, who are willing to listen to a breadth of 
testimony on competence issues, will be skeptical of claims of incompetence 
that are not supported by persuasive evidence.  
Some commentators cite the case mainly because, in the end, Mr. 
Gigante admitted to obstructing the proceedings by ‘faking’ his level of 
mental disorder, thus demonstrating that even well-credentialed and 
celebrated mental health experts can be mistaken where evidence 
undermining the incompetence claim has not been addressed.78 Others, 
however, cite the case as an example of litigation in which the defense knew 
the judge and government were skeptical because of the notoriety of the case 
and the claim of incompetence, so the defense sought to introduce evidence 
from several different evaluators, including a neuroimaging expert, in an 
effort to solidify the defense’s case. In retrospect, it is clear that the 
neuroimaging evidence was not unequivocally supportive of the claim of 
dementia.  
Clearly, part of the reason the judge did not credit the expert 
testimony offered by the defense was because the government’s evidence 
rebutting the showing of Mr. Gigante’s incompetence involved observations 
of lay witnesses (nurses and guards), as well as chronicles about Mr. 
Gigante’s behaviors and interactions while under observation in locked ward 
settings.79 As a teaching tool and cautionary tale, the case is discussed as one 
that demonstrates the need for attention to the ecological validity of testing-
based assessments, including third party and other extensive information 
(nursing notes, videos of meetings, recordings of conversations, etc.) that 
 
76 United States v. Gigante, 996 F.Supp. 194, 220–21 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), as 
amended (1998). 
77 Id.  
78 Kolla, supra note 75, at 151.  
79 Id. at 230–38 (noting inconsistencies between certain testing results and 
everyday behavior observations and results on imaging studies and psychological 
testing results viewed as “inconsistent with other results” and “inadequate and 
misleading.”).  





provide corroborating (or contradictory) evidence.  
Another case referenced in the literature on neuroimaging and 
competence assessment resulted in two differing, successive rulings.80 These 
ruling were entered in United States v. Dr. Jihad Kasim, a criminal case 
prosecuted in the Northern District of Indiana. The first of the Kasim rulings 
(2008) has been cited in several writings as supportive of the utility of 
imaging studies where the defense argues that the accused suffers from 
dementia.81 The case involved charges of Medicare fraud by a board-certified 
pediatrician (Dr. Kasim) who allegedly engaged in the fraud to help cover 
gambling losses. Dr. Kasim’s personal medical history included documented 
treatment for a myocardial infarction during the time period of the alleged 
fraud and a resulting coma with what was initially found to be anoxic brain 
damage. A series of medical assessments and interventions resulted in 
several diagnoses that were brought to the judge’s attention to explain that 
Dr. Kasim’s erratic behavior and described deficits rendered him 
incompetent. While various imaging and other diagnostic procedures raised 
questions about the accused’s condition, the judge was presented with 
evidence from a SPECT scan that he found “demonstrated a marked decrease 
in the blood flow in the front temporal lobes of Kasim’s brain.”82 
On its face, the 2008 ruling indicates that evidence from varying 
sources persuaded the judge that the reported deficits were sufficiently 
established. The judge noted the involvement of clinical psychology, 
neuroradiology, nuclear medicine, neurology, psychiatry, neuropsychology, 
 
80 See Edersheim & Wei, supra note 69, at 96 (citing United States v. Kasim and 
the order from 2008). What is missing is a citation to the 2010 order from the same 
court that arrived at a different conclusion (finding the accused competent to stand 
trial). As noted above, Dr. Kasim’s litigation did not end there either. Similarly, Dr. 
John Meixner cites the 2008 ruling in Kasim in his highly informative above-cited 
article. Meixner, supra note 62, at 1013, n.100. It does not appear that the further 
2010 order is cited. These observations are not meant to criticize either of the works 
just cited, though they are intended to point out that the utility of looking at the 
dockets of rulings made in competence cases now that such dockets are more 
generally available to lawyers, scholars, and members of the public online allow an 
understanding in certain cases, such as Gigante and Kasim of the reason that 
competence issues once raised in a complex case tend to be revisited. 
81 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Frances X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the 
United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 349, 355 (Tade M. Spranger ed., 
2012). 
82 United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89137, at 
*17 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008).  





and neurosurgery in the evidence before the Court.83 The judge concluded in 
2008 that: “Kasim’s poor judgment and lack of cooperation with defense 
counsel are the result of progressive debilitating disease of dementia.”84 The 
judge found Kasim incompetent to stand trial. 
The 2008 order referred Dr. Kasim to a Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Medical Facility where staff conducted an independent review and concluded 
that Dr. Kasim appeared to them to be competent to stand trial. This 
development is not unprecedented, in the sense that not infrequently an 
accused initially ruled incompetent and then referred to a state facility may 
either be found to be competent during further evaluations or restored to 
competence during the hospital stay.  
After a new hearing in 2009, the court ruled in 2010 that Dr. Kasim 
was competent to stand trial. This turn of events was significant since, in 
2008, the judge had noted that it appeared that Dr. Kasim might never regain 
competence and that the evidence supported the view that Dr. Kasim had a 
chronic debilitating condition. During the course of the 2009 hearing, 
however, a board certified neurologist testified convincingly,85 opining that 
“a SPECT scan had been considered an unreliable biological marker of 
dementia” since 2001, based on variabilities in the patient and given issues 
with the quality of the resolution of the imaging. This opinion, apparently 
uncontradicted by other evidence, convinced the judge to side with the 
opinion that the imaging studies “show no biological markers of frontal 
temporal lobe dementia, anoxic encephalopathy, or any other neurological 
brain disorder.”86 
Furthermore, the judge accepted the opinion of a neuropsychologist 
employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons that Dr. Kasim’s observed 
behavior was inconsistent with dementia as were subsequent neurological 
examinations.87 The Government also obtained recordings of phone calls 
which revealed that Dr. Kasim “…was coherent, lucid, capable of analytical 
thinking and planning, and able to communicate his concerns and ideas to 
others.”88  
Readers can certainly be excused for wondering why Gigante and 
 
83 Id. at *1–9. 
84 Id. at *51–53. 
85 Id. at *2–4. 
86 Id. at *3–4. 
87 Id. at *8–10. 
88 Id. at *11–12. 





Kasim would be reviewed as examples of the use of neuroimaging in a 
competence assessment if the outcome in both cases was a finding by a judge 
that ultimately the neuroimaging evidence failed to support the opinion(s) 
about the accused’s claimed incompetence. Here, it may be useful to 
underscore that the definition of competence to stand trial is not one specified 
by medical, psychiatric, or psychological diagnostic systems. The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association, 
or the International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) published by the 
World Health Organization – or other diagnostic systems used in the medical 
and mental health professions – do not determine who will be ruled to be 
legally competent or incompetent in a criminal case. A theme that is 
introduced in the review of the two cases examined above is that when a 
competence question becomes subject to a fulsome courtroom-based 
examination, and where the prosecution and defense each present 
‘competing’ evidence on the question of competence, there are likely to be 
differing views presented—including differing views on the meaning of 
pertinent neuroimaging evidence. On occasion, the evidence that seems to be 
most incompatible with claims of the accused’s incompetence was the 
evidence provided by reports from lay witnesses who had conversations with 
the accused, recordings of interviews, or of phone calls. That said, as 
discussed in the two further cases below, where the totality of evidence, 
including the imaging studies, supports the basis for the weight of evaluators’ 
opinions, it also demonstrates the utility of the neuroimaging evidence in 
supporting claims of incompetence or disability. 
Where a knowledgeable court and experienced lawyers (on both 
sides) are involved, there is an awareness that psychiatrists, psychologists, 
neuropsychologists, behavioral neurologists, neuroradiologists, and forensic 
mental health professionals of various kinds have a number of tools available 
to them to assist the courts (and lawyers) in the assessment of competence to 
stand trial. In the end, when the incompetence question is contested, it is a 
judicial ruling that will essentially spell out the legally required 
determination – and essentially will represent the judicial finding or 
judicially created ‘diagnosis’ of either competence or incompetence. Where 
the available neuroimaging evidence is subject to data-based criticism, as 
happened in the cases just discussed, a judge is likely to find that the evidence 
does not support the claim of incompetence.  
Defense lawyers are well aware that the United States Supreme 
Court has explained that the right to counsel in criminal cases means the right 





to effective assistance of counsel.89 One appellate court provides a reminder 
of the role that counsel play in the decision-making that results in competence 
inquiries: 
Trial counsel and the trial court each have important roles to play in 
ensuring that only competent defendants are tried.… But the court typically 
only has limited contact with criminal defendants; it is not in the best position 
to identify those in need of competency evaluations. Normally, it is defense 
counsel who has the most exposure to the defendant’s behavior and (prior to 
any expert evaluation) “the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to 
participate in his defense.”90Considering their ethical obligation to provide 
legal assistance according to the prevailing standard of practice, defense 
lawyers could reasonably seek advice from and consider – especially where 
budgeting permits it – the involvement of as many sources of useful and 
relevant information, as well as supporting or corroborating evidence, as 
possible to address a pending competence question. These efforts may well 
appropriately include inviting the involvement of neuroscientists and 
neuroimaging tools of various kinds. 
The following two cases help illustrate situations in which multi-
disciplinary assessments of competence conducted over a lengthy period of 
time, and involving neuroimaging evidence, resulted in findings that 
essentially concluded the proceedings—there was no trial of the charges in 
either case because of the accused’s mental condition. One is a case litigated 
in the State of Hawaii in which the court’s eventual determination was that 
the accused was incompetent to stand trial and was not likely to regain the 
competence to stand trial. The judge agreed that the criminal charges should 
be dismissed and that the accused should be subject to a guardianship, 
together with continuing confinement in a state hospital setting. The second 
ruling that we examine was entered in a California state court case in which 
imaging studies of the accused’s brain conducted several years into the 
inquiry helped experts identify abnormal brain structure and specific 
compromised brain function that solidified the basis for a finding of 
incompetence and an eventual resolution of the case. 
The Hawaii based adjudication involved a neuroimaging component 
and extensive testimony from a number of professional disciplines, which 
 
89 See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. 
90 Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 342 (D.C. App. 2013) (citing Medina, 
505 U.S. at 450).  





resulted in a 124-page trial court ruling.91 This ruling, from 2018, emerged 
from an assessment process in which the combination of the State prosecutor, 
the defense, and a third entity – a state hospital system or a prison hospital 
system – each contributed diagnostic information, competence assessment 
reports, and a breadth of expertise, which included a review of historical 
imaging studies of the accused plus updated imaging studies conducted 
during the progress of the competence related assessments after the accused’s 
arrest. 
Adam Mau was charged with violation of state law resulting from a 
home invasion, kidnapping, and robberies that had left three persons dead. 
Prior to the charged crimes, including the three criminal homicides, Mr. Mau 
had a history of hospitalizations and periods of psychiatric treatment. Once 
he was charged, the defense initiated a number of evaluations of Mr. Mau, 
one of which included the reexamination, with updated software packages, 
of MRI data (Magnetic Resonance Imaging data) that predated the Mau 
criminal case indictment. Mr. Mau then underwent further post-arrest 
structural and functional imaging studies, psychiatric assessment, 
psychological assessment, neuropsychological assessments, medication 
effect assessment, and competence-specific forensic assessment. In its 
review of some of the evidence, the Hawaii court noted that professionals in 
various disciplines generated a total of thirty-five reports between 2006 and 
2016 – some through the Hawaii state hospital system, some as a result of 
requests by the defense, and some order by the court. 
The Mau court order chronicles an unusually lengthy period of time 
devoted to the assessment of the accused Adam Mau’s competence, 
including periodic assessments and hearings held during the State’s efforts 
to restore Mr. Mau into competence to stand trial. The presiding judge’s 
detailed finding (entered more than ten years into the pendency of the case) 
 
91 State of Hawai’i v. Adam Mau, No. 1PC0610013931 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 
2018) (order regarding Adam Mau’s competence to stand trial and granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss indictments). The authors extend appreciation to 
attorney Brook Hart, Adam Mau’s lead counsel, for his courtesy in providing case 
materials. Mr. Hart had extensive experience in the defense of complex, notorious 
cases, at the time he defended Adam Mau. He was able to retain the services of 
examiners from Hawaii as well as the mainland, including some leading authorities 
on the forensic competence assessment process in preparing defense evidence. The 
court and the state involved a number of the state’s leading forensic examiners in the 
case as well. Coauthor John Philipsborn served as one of several consultants to Brook 
Hart during the litigation on the issue of Mr. Mau’s competence to stand trial. 





demonstrates the care with which Mr. Mau’s history was investigated so that 
a wide range of information was available for the judge to consider, such as 
treatment at birth for cyanosis (a brain blood oxygen deficiency) and a history 
of six separate head traumas, several of which resulted in contemporaneous 
medical treatment with resulting medical records. These matters were 
accompanied by a history of psychiatric hospitalizations and treatments, and 
pre-offense psychological and psychiatric assessments. Mr. Mau was given 
prescriptions for psychotropic medications and ordered to be managed under 
a formal guardianship even before his arrest in the murder case. 
In part because of the extensive medical and psychiatric history, the 
existence of historical (meaning pre-murder charges) structural MRI studies 
led defense counsel to seek a court order permitting both Positron Emission 
Tomography and further MRI examination (motions that were opposed by 
the State). These were imaging studies aimed at buttressing (and further 
explaining) findings arrived at during periodic neuropsychological testing. 
As parties undertook litigation about the utility of further imaging studies 
following Hawaii’s competence assessment procedures, a court-appointed 
panel of three mental health professionals periodically evaluated Mr. Mau 
and their opinions, as reflected in the court order, changed over time as 
further history emerged and they received information. 
Treating medical and psychiatric staff at the detention facilities 
housing Mr. Mau had opportunities to observe Mr. Mau and interact with 
him extensively. Even outside consultants had such opportunities. For 
example, one outside evaluator was described as having spent fifty-seven 
hours interviewing Mr. Mau over twenty-four separate interviews conducted 
in the eight-year period between 2006 and 2014.92 That same examiner 
opined that after five years of treatment with Clozaril (an antipsychotic 
medication), Mr. Mau continued to produce results on competence 
assessment tools administered to him (including the MacCAT-CA and 
ECST-R) showing “…a substantial impairment of his rational understanding 
of his legal situation and ability to assist counsel.”93 
The court’s order explained that it continued to consider the periodic 
‘three-panel’ evaluations conducted by the designated examiners, as well as 
evidence tendered in the form of nursing summaries, reports from custodial 
staff, progress notes, state hospital recovery plan related information, and the 
like. During one of several periodic hearings, the court heard testimony based 
 
92 Id. at 31.  
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on neuropsychological testing, imaging studies, competence specific 
assessment, response to medication, and hospital staff related observations. 
Counsel for Mr. Mau offered information about their problematic 
communications with him. The court also took into account contrary 
opinions, including opinions that were linked to assessment interviews that 
had been videotaped and shown to the court.94 
The court acknowledged the salience of the information provided by 
experts with extensive experience in imaging studies as to how this 
information intertwined with facts gleaned from the neuropsychological 
assessment sessions psychiatrists had performed over a period of years. The 
growing data base supported the view that it was unlikely that Mr. Mau could 
be restored to competence.95 
Admittedly, the trajectory of Adam Mau in the State of Hawaii’s 
criminal court and mental health systems can be considered unusual in 
comparison to the level of care shown by many state trial courts in 
competence assessment situations. The Mau case generally fits the definition 
of a complex case involving allegations of serious crimes and the potential 
for an extended sentence, in which the claim of incompetence required 
extensive attempts at evaluation and restoration to competence before the 
final order dismissing the case and referring Mr. Mau to a mental health 
guardianship in a hospital setting was reached. The State of Hawaii does not 
employ the death penalty, but Mr. Mau was eligible for life sentence(s). This 
was a case with serious sentencing consequences. Mr. Mau, as have others 
who have been able to seek the services of a wide range of experts, had access 
to financial resources, and was in a state that has a well-developed procedure 
for competence assessments. The state court was also willing to conduct 
careful reviews of the case episodically, thanks in part to Mr. Mau’s 
representation by a robust defense team, led by highly accomplished lead 
counsel with experience in complex case defense involving mental condition 
issues. 
The final exemplar discussed here arose in California and was 
litigated in the San Francisco Superior Court.96 Jehad Baqleh was a San 
 
94 Id. at 86 (reviewing the court’s account of its viewing of video interviews). 
95 Id. at 48 (relating impairments found through neuropsychological assessment 
over a period of years to the left frontotemporal region of the brain). 
96 See, e.g., People v. Baqleh, No. 183548 (Cal. Super. Ct.). The case resulted in 
 
 





Francisco taxicab driver who was arrested and prosecuted for the rape, 
robbery, and murder of a young female passenger. As in the above-referenced 
Mau case, the inquiries into Mr. Baqleh’s mental condition and competence 
occurred over a period of years. By the time the contested evidentiary 
hearings on competence took place for a second time - some ten years into 
the pendency of the case and following Mr. Baqleh’s hospitalization in a state 
hospital - there were thirteen assessment reports and numerous interview 
records and considerable other materials descriptive of Mr. Baqleh’s 
background, historical behavior, impairments, and diagnoses available for 
review by examiners.97 The court heard evidence from various 
neuropsychological, psychiatric, and forensic competence examiners, 
including by court-appointed examiners who conducted examinations while 
the accused was in jail. Psychiatrists and psychologists also had examined 
Mr. Baqleh in state hospitals where he received treatment in an attempt to 
restore competence.  
During the second set of hearings on competence, the trial court 
received a number of reports from individuals who were directly involved in 
the trial preparation, including a report from an experienced lawyer who had 
ceased practicing law to become a licensed private investigator and 
mitigation specialist. This person had an unusual blend of professional 
training and experience that allowed her to provide informed perspectives 
about the implications of Mr. Baqleh’s deficits and limitations when defense 
team members attempted to confer with Mr. Baqleh to discuss the case and 
the prospects of trial. The deficits in question were tied directly to Mr. 
Baqleh’s inadequate capacity for rational communication with his counsel, 
and to his inability to assist in his defense given his demonstrated 
impairments.  
The defense offered evidence of incompetence linked to cognitive 
disorders, impairments in episodic memory, and difficulties in language 
 
at least one published opinion from the California Court of Appeal which reviewed 
procedures under which a court ordered examination of Mr. Baqleh could take place. 
Baqleh v. Super. Ct., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Lead counsel for 
Mr. Baqleh, Michael Burt, is a lawyer who has gained a national reputation for his 
knowledgeable and sophisticated lawyering of Federal and State capital cases. He 
has been involved in numerous cases involving novel questions about scientific and 
technical evidence. Mr. Burt is regularly involved in the training of lawyers who 
defend death penalty cases. 
97 One examiner listed ninety-seven different categories of records and materials 
made available for him to review prior to a 2008 hearing. 





processing. Because of the disagreements between the state’s experts and the 
defense’s experts, several years into the competence litigation, it was 
recommended that Mr. Baqleh be sent for neuroimaging studies at a 
University of California hospital. Structural and functional imaging was 
performed using differing techniques, resulting in an unusual finding that 
appeared to correlate with a history of reported cognitive disorder and 
learning disabilities. Based on the imaging and additional evidence of areas 
of brain injury, doctors opined that Mr. Baqleh suffered from colpocephaly, 
a cephalic disorder causing brain structure malformations that are associated 
with a variety of neurological syndromes and disorders.98 The imaging 
studies provided some explanation for the deficits that had been described 
through forensic psychiatric, neuropsychological, and psychological 
evaluations. The results of the imaging studies provided both the parties and 
a wide variety of state and defense physicians and mental health experts 
staffing the case for the State and defense with evidence that there were 
genuine, resident, and chronic issues with Mr. Baqleh’s cognitive functions 
that warranted a mental health basis to resolve the case, resulting in a 
commitment of Mr. Baqleh to a state hospital. 
VIII. 
LAWYERING AND FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS OF 
PRACTICE WILL CALL FOR PRACTITIONERS TO CONSIDER 
NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS TOOLS IN COMPETENCE ASSESSMENTS 
A recent survey of literature on neuroscience evidence in the United 
States and other common law courts noted “the use of neuroscientific 
evidence as buttressing…, detecting…, or sorting devices….”99 
Neuroscience appears to most often be offered either as one of the methods 
of detecting a cause, or as an explanation of an otherwise observed, 
documented, and assessed deficit or injury. Also, such evidence, including 
 
98 Jacob Landman et al., Radiological Colpocephaly: A Congenital 
Malformation or the Result of Intrauterine and Perinatal Brain Damage, 11 BRAIN 
& DEV. 313 (1989). 
99 Darby Aono et al., Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review, 4 
COGNITIVE RSCH.: PRINCIPLES & IMPLICATIONS 1, 4 (2019), 
https://canlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Aono_2019_neuroscience_courtroom_revi
ew.pdf (referencing Owen Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in 
NEUROSCIENCES AND THE HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN 
ACTIVITIES 181 (Antonio Battro et al., ed. 2013)).  





neuroimaging, is offered to buttress a claim of disorder, deficit, or, as 
pertinent here, of incompetence, which is also rooted in findings made 
through other means (neuropsychology, neuropsychiatry, forensic testing 
assessment, etc.).  
For lawyers and courts, it is of some significance that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel have been tethered to allegations of 
inadequate consideration or presentation of neuroscience evidence. In other 
words, neuroscience and neuroimaging are sufficiently established as 
scientific and technical endeavors that may inform decision-making in U.S. 
courts that lawyers should address these areas of science in professionally 
adequate and legally defensible ways where such evidence may be warranted 
or is actually presented.100 
A review of the cases discussed above presents lawyers and judges 
with examples of competence adjudications in which several different types 
of evidence and expertise were presented. In three of the four examples, 
neuroimaging evidence was offered as a buttress. In the fourth of the cases 
(Baqleh), it was offered in the category of a ‘detection’ tool, which allowed 
“the use of neuroscience to gain otherwise elusive insights, such as the extent 
of brain injuries….”101 
Neuroscientists and some legal scholars have sounded words of 
caution about mistaken and cynical uses of neuroscience evidence in 
courtrooms. There are varying viewpoints on the level of contribution that 
brain imaging and other techniques can make in informing judges and juries 
about a given individual’s claimed disorders and deficits, particularly as a 
means of identifying the cause of specific behavior.102 It may be that lawyers 
can be faulted in specific litigation for ‘overselling’ the utility of particular 
neuroimaging or other neuroscience-based studies. But, at the present time, 
a combination of the working definition of professionally adequate lawyering 
of a competence to stand trial issue and the competence-related practice 
 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 4. 
102 See, e.g., Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? 
Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 240 (2007) (contrasting 
scientists to lawyers, explaining: “Lawyers, unlike scientists, are advocates, and 
therefore operate within a different paradigm.”). On one hand, these coauthors make 
the useful point that lawyers are advocating for a client by marshaling available facts. 
On the other, as a variety of litigation has demonstrated, learned, accomplished, and 
celebrated scientists can have differing views of and claim different levels of support 
for what are claimed to be scientific methodologies, diagnoses, and research. 





assessment guidelines, literature, and existing case law, supports the view 
that lawyers should seek consultation and advice on the tools and techniques 
associated with neuroscience from examiners involved in a competence 
assessment. If there is pre-existing imaging or other neuroscience related 
information in a case (as covered in the AAPL Guidelines (2007) and 
exemplified in the above-described Mau litigation, lawyers should obtain 
information about the utility of that information, and the advisability of 
obtaining additional imaging or related evidence. Whether to actually employ 
neuroimaging or other specialized neuroscience evidence will remain a 
matter of case-specific professional judgment.  
CONCLUSION 
The effort here has included a review of pertinent literature, some of 
which has yet to find its way into the discussion of neuroscience and law. 
Neuroimaging evidence has been considered in competence adjudications 
prior to the more recent attention to neuroscience and law literature over the 
past fifteen years. In part because it is the responsibility of courts to ensure 
that the accused in a criminal case is competent to stand trial, judges and 
lawyers should share information about competency. A review of published 
cases from federal and state reviewing courts demonstrates the 
acknowledgement that there can be a variety of reasons that a competence 
question is raised in a criminal case. Clearly, courts have an interest in 
attempting to sort out genuine, compelling claims of incompetence from 
those that are not supported by the evidence. Some courts – including those 
discussed above in the case studies – have shown an interest in permitting 
wide-ranging evidence on a claim of incompetence. It is clear from examples 
discussed here that judges do not necessarily credit the more prestigious 
experts or the side that happens to introduce neuroimaging or other 
neuroscience evidence. The incentive is for the parties in well-researched and 
litigated matters to present multiple sources of information to address the 
issue, and this may call for a neuroscientist’s expertise, even where 
neuroimaging is not specifically informative. 
It continues to be pointed out that courts and lawyers may lack the 
training and familiarity with the intersection between the neurosciences and 
law to even be aware of the utility of neuroscience. Efforts continue to 
remedy that deficit, and it may be that the increased proliferation of literature 
and training opportunities will serve to increase the quality and reliability of 
competence assessment going forward. 
